Abstract
Ethical naturalism is sometimes accused of problematic metaphysics or
epistemology. Some argue that naturalists rely on concepts of ‘nature’ indefensible in the light of
modern evolutionary biology. There is also an epistemological worry that has been raised
recently that strong normative evaluation, such as meaning in human life, is empirically
inaccessible or even in conflict with what we know in scientific contexts. While the critics have
targeted Aristotelian and Neo-Aristotelian views, I will appeal to an argument from the Neo-
Confucian Zhu Xi as one potential way that we can respond to skeptics. If we can know that
human beings are capable of moral goodness, and it is comprehensible for us to take moral
goodness as a final or unifying goal of our lives, then we can respond to the skeptical objections
which allege that we cannot sustain rich normative judgments about meaning in life in the face of
scientific evidence.