Suspending judgment the correct way

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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In this paper I present reasons for us to accept the hypothesis that suspended judgment has correctness conditions, just like beliefs do. Roughly put, the idea is that suspended judgment about p is correct when both p and ¬p might be true in view of certain facts that characterize the subject’s situation. The reasons to accept that hypothesis are broadly theoretical ones: it adds unifying power to our epistemological theories, it delivers good and conservative consequences, and it allows us to assess processes of reasoning involving attitudes of suspended judgment.

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Luis Rosa
University of Cologne


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