Suspending judgment the correct way

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper I present reasons for us to accept the hypothesis that suspended judgment has correctness conditions, just like beliefs do. Roughly put, the idea is that suspended judgment about p is correct when both p and ¬p might be true in view of certain facts that characterize the subject’s situation. The reasons to accept that hypothesis are broadly theoretical ones: it adds unifying power to our epistemological theories, it delivers good and conservative consequences, and it allows us to assess processes of reasoning involving attitudes of suspended judgment.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ROSSJT-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-10-09
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-10-09

Total views
311 ( #22,347 of 65,600 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
102 ( #6,312 of 65,600 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.