Order:
See also
Luis Rosa
University of Cologne
  1. Logical Principles of Agnosticism.Luis Rosa - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1263-1283.
    Logic arguably plays a role in the normativity of reasoning. In particular, there are plausible norms of belief/disbelief whose antecedents are constituted by claims about what follows from what. But is logic also relevant to the normativity of agnostic attitudes? The question here is whether logical entailment also puts constraints on what kinds of things one can suspend judgment about. In this paper I address that question and I give a positive answer to it. In particular, I advance two logical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  2. Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis.Luis Rosa - 2012 - Logos and Episteme (4):571-577.
    In this paper, I offer two counterexamples to the so-called ‘Uniqueness Thesis.’ As one of these examples rely on the thesis that it is possible for a justified belief to be based on an inconsistent body of evidence, I also offer reasons for this further thesis. On the assumption that doxastic justification entails propositional justification, the counterexamples seem to work.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  3. Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis Again.Luis Rosa - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):95-100.
    I reinforce my defense of permissivism about the rationality of doxastic attitudes on the face of a certain body of evidence against criticism published in this journal by Anantharaman. After making some conceptual clarifications, I manage to show that at least one of my original arguments pro-permissivism is left unscathed by Anantharaman's points.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Introduction to Special Volume.Luis Rosa - 2013 - Intuitio 6 (2):189-199.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Knowledge Grounded on Pure Reasoning.Luis Rosa - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):156-173.
    In this paper I deal with epistemological issues that stem from the hypothesis that reasoning is not only a means of transmitting knowledge from premise-beliefs to conclusion-beliefs, but also a primary source of knowledge in its own right. The idea is that one can gain new knowledge on the basis of suppositional reasoning. After making some preliminary distinctions, I argue that there are no good reasons to think that purported examples of knowledge grounded on pure reasoning are just examples of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Suspending Judgment the Correct Way.Luis Rosa - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    In this paper I present reasons for us to accept the hypothesis that suspended judgment has correctness conditions, just like beliefs do. Roughly put, the idea is that suspended judgment about p is correct when both p and ¬p might be true in view of certain facts that characterize the subject’s situation. The reasons to accept that hypothesis are broadly theoretical ones: it adds unifying power to our epistemological theories, it delivers good and conservative consequences, and it allows us to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark