The Problem of Truth in the Classical Analysis of Knowledge

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Abstract
In this article I propose a new problem for the classical analysis of knowledge (as justified true belief) and all analyses belonging to its legacy. The gist of my argument is that truth as a condition for a belief to be knowledge is problematic insofar there is no definition of truth. From this, and other remarks relating to the possibility of defining truth (or lack thereof) and about what truth theories fit our thoughts about knowledge, I conclude that as long as truth is unquestioningly taken as a condition of knowing, knowledge can never be defined in a way that could satisfy our intuitions about it.
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Archival date: 2017-12-15
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2017-12-15

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