The virtue of curiosity

Episteme 17 (1):105-120 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
ABSTRACTA thriving project in contemporary epistemology concerns identifying and explicating the epistemic virtues. Although there is little sustained argument for this claim, a number of prominent sources suggest that curiosity is an epistemic virtue. In this paper, I provide an account of the virtue of curiosity. After arguing that virtuous curiosity must be appropriately discerning, timely and exacting, I then situate my account in relation to two broader questions for virtue responsibilists: What sort of motivations are required for epistemic virtue? And do epistemic virtues need to be reliable? I will sketch an account on which curiosity is only virtuous when rooted in a non-instrumental appreciation of epistemic goods, before arguing that curiosity can exhibit intellectual virtue irrespective of whether one is reliable in satisfying it.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ROSTVO-11
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-12-16
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-08-02

Total views
338 ( #16,783 of 58,376 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
80 ( #8,353 of 58,376 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.