Why content must be a matter of truth conditions
Philosophical Quarterly 39 (156):257-275 (1989)
Abstract
It is argued that if, with Dummett, we see assertion as an act governed by conditions of correctness which makes a claim to the effect that these conditions are met, then the conditions of correctness that determine its content must have the impersonal character of a requirement of truth, rather than the speaker-relative character of a requirement of justification or assertibility. For otherwise it would be impossible for different speakers to use the same words to make an assertion with the same content.
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2009-01-28
Total views
220 ( #26,735 of 2,439,463 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #52,747 of 2,439,463 )
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