Why content must be a matter of truth conditions
Philosophical Quarterly 39 (156):257-275 (1989)
Abstract
It is argued that if, with Dummett, we see assertion as an act governed by conditions of correctness which makes a claim to the effect that these conditions are met, then the conditions of correctness that determine its content must have the impersonal character of a requirement of truth, rather than the speaker-relative character of a requirement of justification or assertibility. For otherwise it would be impossible for different speakers to use the same words to make an assertion with the same content.Author's Profile
DOI
10.2307/2220171
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2009-01-28
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2009-01-28
Downloads
281 (#31,659)
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50 (#25,962)
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