How to explain the fail inexplaining consciousness


At the heart of one of the many problems concerning consciousness, there are flaws in our thinking that impede a philosophical understanding of the world. At the same time, I understand philosophy as a rigorous science aimed at “knowledge of the general”, reflecting the most fundamental and universal relations of reality, meaningful thanks to two types of comparative concepts. One of them is specific-scientific comparative concepts of different types, reflecting the beginnings of natural scientific knowledge, while the second type is specific-general comparative concepts of different types. Without creating a concrete-universal theory, with the generally recognized philosophical language of comparative concepts, it is impossible to explain one of the fundamental difficulties: with the help of what linguistic means can consciousness be entered as a subjective reality into the physical picture of the world, how to fill this “gap in explanation”? In my opinion, this is the language comparative concepts of different types.


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