How might degrees of belief shift? On action conflicting with professed beliefs

Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):732-742 (2016)
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People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions. But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of beliefs may shift.
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