Abstract

In the twenty-fifth chapter of the second book of Etymologies, epitome of the Isagoge of Profirius, the sevillian philosopher Isidore of Seville, taking the example of the tyrian thinker, takes up the anthropo-philosophical theory of 'homo risv capax', that is, the human being defined as the only living being, mortal or immortal, irrational or rational, capable of laughing. Or, in others word, laughter understood as what is (most) proper -in the sense of exclusive- to the human being. A theory that has a long trajectory in the history of ancient Western philosophy up to the approach of the philosopher from Seville (and also after him). This article presents the Isidorean proposal by showing the background, both general and specific, to the question of laughter as a singular and distinctive human property, as well as a delimitation of the sense exposed in the thought and work of Isidore of Seville, together with the existing differences between those of the Sevillian thinker and his philosophical precedents, that is, his specific contributions.