Embodiment, Consciousness, and the Massively Representational Mind

Philosophical Topics 39 (1):99-120 (2011)
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Abstract

In this paper, I claim that extant empirical data do not support a radically embodied understanding of the mind but, instead, suggest (along with a variety of other results) a massively representational view. According to this massively representational view, the brain is rife with representations that possess overlapping and redundant content, and many of these represent other mental representations or derive their content from them. Moreover, many behavioral phenomena associated with attention and consciousness are best explained by the coordinated activity of units with redundant content. I finish by arguing that this massively representational picture challenges the reliability of a priori theorizing about consciousness.

Author's Profile

Robert D. Rupert
University of Colorado, Boulder

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