Sorabji and the dilemma of determinism

Analysis 44 (4):166 (1984)
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Abstract
IN Necessity, Cause and Blame (London: Duckworth, 1980) Richard Sorabji attempts to develop a notion of moral responsibility which does not get caught on either horn of a well known dilemma. One horn is the argument that if an action was caused then it must have been necessary and therefore could not be one for which the agent is responsible. The other horn is the argument that if the action was not caused then it is inexplicable and random and therefore not something which the agent can be responsible for. Sorabji denies that what is caused is always necessitated. Causes are primarily explanatory rather than necessitating. This established, Sorabji hopes to show that action open to moral scrutiny may be caused without being necessitated and the dilemma collapses. I will argue that this strategy runs into serious difficulties.
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Indeterminismo e liberdade em Hume.Pereira JĂșnior, Alfredo

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