Original Sin, the Fall, and Epistemic Self-Trust

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone engaged in the project of self-reflection after gaining a reason to distrust their epistemic selves on the basis of a construal of a doctrine of the Fall. I close by introducing the worry as a formal argument and demonstrate the self-undermining nature of such an argument.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
RUTOST
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-03-03
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Utilitarianism For and Against.Smart, J. J. C. & Williams, Bernard
Evidentialism.Feldman, Richard & Conee, Earl
The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Kornblith, Hilary & Foley, Richard

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-03-03

Total views
174 ( #18,371 of 42,409 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
55 ( #11,579 of 42,409 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.