In Defense of Moral Evidentialism

Logos and Episteme 6 (4):405-427 (2015)
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Abstract
This paper is a defense of moral evidentialism, the view that we have a moral obligation to form the doxastic attitude that is best supported by our evidence. I will argue that two popular arguments against moral evidentialism are weak. I will also argue that our commitments to the moral evaluation of actions require us to take doxastic obligations seriously.
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ISBN(s)
2069-0533
PhilPapers/Archive ID
RYAIDO
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Archival date: 2017-01-08
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A Case for Epistemic Agency.Dustin Olson - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):449-474.

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A Case for Epistemic Agency.Dustin Olson - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):449-474.

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