In Defense of Moral Evidentialism
Logos and Episteme 6 (4):405-427 (2015)
Abstract
This paper is a defense of moral evidentialism, the view that we have a moral obligation to form the doxastic attitude that is best supported by our evidence. I will argue that two popular arguments against moral evidentialism are weak. I will also argue that our commitments to the moral evaluation of actions require us to take doxastic obligations seriously.
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ISBN(s)
2069-0533
PhilPapers/Archive ID
RYAIDO
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2017-01-08
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502 ( #9,719 of 55,780 )
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49 ( #15,368 of 55,780 )
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