Grasp of concepts: common sense and expertise in an inferentialist framework

In M. Bianca P. Piccari (ed.), Epistemology of Ordinary Knowledge. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 289-297 (2015)
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The paper suggests a distinction between two dimensions of grasp of concepts within an inferentialist approach to conceptual content: a common sense "minimum" version, where a simple speaker needs just a few inferences to grasp a concept C, and an expert version, where the specialist is able to master a wide range of inferential transitions involving C. This paper tries to defend this distinction and to explore some of its basic implications.

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Pietro Salis
Universita di Cagliari


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