Grasp of concepts: common sense and expertise in an inferentialist framework

In M. Bianca P. Piccari (ed.), Epistemology of Ordinary Knowledge. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 289-297 (2015)
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Abstract
The paper suggests a distinction between two dimensions of grasp of concepts within an inferentialist approach to conceptual content: a common sense "minimum" version, where a simple speaker needs just a few inferences to grasp a concept C, and an expert version, where the specialist is able to master a wide range of inferential transitions involving C. This paper tries to defend this distinction and to explore some of its basic implications.
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Holism: A Shopper's Guide.Fodor, Jerry A. & Lepore, Ernest
Blind Reasoning.Boghossian, Paul & Williamson, Timothy

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