Grasp of concepts: common sense and expertise in an inferentialist framework

In M. Bianca P. Piccari (ed.), Epistemology of Ordinary Knowledge. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 289-297 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The paper suggests a distinction between two dimensions of grasp of concepts within an inferentialist approach to conceptual content: a common sense "minimum" version, where a simple speaker needs just a few inferences to grasp a concept C, and an expert version, where the specialist is able to master a wide range of inferential transitions involving C. This paper tries to defend this distinction and to explore some of its basic implications.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SALGOC
Upload history
Archival date: 2016-01-07
View other versions
Added to PP index
2016-01-07

Total views
561 ( #8,043 of 54,419 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
78 ( #7,581 of 54,419 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.