Against Scanlon's Theory of the Strength of Practical Reasons

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Abstract
We often say that one reason is stronger, or weightier, than another. These are metaphors. What does normative strength or weight really consist in? Scanlon (2014) offers a novel answer to this question. His answer appeals to counterfactuals of various kinds. I argue that appealing to counterfactuals leads to deep problems for his view.
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Archival date: 2016-08-22
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Reasons and Normativity.Green Werkmäster, Jakob

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2016-08-22

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