Genealogia epistêmica e normas de credibilidade

Sofia 1 (7):126-146 (2018)
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In this paper, I present two ways of conceiving a genealogical explanation of the concept of knowledge. The first one is through the epistemic state of nature hypothesis developed by Edward Craig, according to which knowledge is understood as a concept evolved from the concept of a good informant. After considering Craig’s project, I draw a parallel between this approach and Miranda Fricker’s value-laden account of the same concept. Then, I present and discuss Fricker’s social take on Craig’s genealogy, in which she suggests that the notions of a good informant and of knowledge are necessarily dependent on the establishment of a credibility norm, and that this norm should be viewed as inherently political. Lastly, I defend an illustration, through Kristie Dotson’s work, of how both genealogical approaches could explain and offer solutions to failings in the normativity of our epistemic systems.
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