How Not To Know The Principle of Induction

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell presents a justification of induction based on a principle he refers to as “the principle of induction”. Owing to the ambiguity of the notion of probability, the principle of induction may be interpreted in two different ways. If interpreted in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability, the principle of induction may be known a priori to be true. But it is unclear how this should give us any confidence in our use of induction, since induction is applied to the external world outside our minds. If the principle is interpreted in light of the objective interpretation of induction, it cannot be known to be true a priori, since it applies to frequencies that occur in the world outside the mind, and these cannot be known without recourse to experience. Russell’s principle of induction therefore fails to provide a satisfactory justification of induction.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SANHNT
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-01-13
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-01-13

Total views
31 ( #52,880 of 56,084 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
31 ( #25,426 of 56,084 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.