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  1. Why did Bertrand Russell write so many things that he attached a low value to?Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    I present an answer to the title question which relates Russell’s writings to a remark by C.D. Broad. Russell shared the same concerns as Broad about the new postgraduate students at the University of Cambridge but instead of voicing them, his writings left a problem.
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  2. Meinongian Merits and Maladies.Samuel Hoadley-Brill - manuscript
    According to what has long been the dominant school of thought in analytic meta-ontology––defended not only by W. V. O. Quine, but also by Bertrand Russell, Alvin Plantinga, Peter van Inwagen, and many others––the meaning of ‘there is’ is identical to the meaning of ‘there exists.’ The most (in)famous aberration from this view is advanced by Alexius Meinong, whose ontological picture has endured extensive criticism (and borderline abuse) from several subscribers to the majority view. Meinong denies the identity of being (...)
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  3. Russell's 1927 The Analysis of Matter as the First Book on Quantum Gravity.Said Mikki - manuscript
    The goal of this note is to bring into wider attention the often neglected important work by Bertrand Russell on the foundations of physics published in the late 1920s. In particular, we emphasize how the book The Analysis of Matter can be considered the earliest systematic attempt to unify the modern quantum theory, just emerging by that time, with general relativity. More importantly, it is argued that the idea of what I call Russell space, introduced in Part III of that (...)
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  4. "If-then" as a version of "Implies".Matheus Silva - manuscript
    Russell’s role in the controversy about the paradoxes of material implication is usually presented as a tale of how even the greatest minds can fall prey to basic conceptual confusions. Quine accused him of making a silly mistake in Principia Mathematica. He interpreted “if- then” as a version of “implies” and called it material implication. Quine’s accusation is that this decision involved a use-mention fallacy because the antecedent and consequent of “if-then” are used instead of being mentioned as the premise (...)
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  5. The Quasi-Verbal Dispute Between Kripke and 'Frege-Russell'.J. P. Smit - manuscript
    Traditional descriptivism and Kripkean causalism are standardly interpreted as rival theories on a single topic. I argue that there is no such shared topic, i.e. that there is no question that they can be interpreted as giving rival answers to. The only way to make sense of the commitment to epistemic transparency that characterizes traditional descriptivism is to interpret Russell and Frege as proposing rival accounts of how to characterize a subject’s beliefs about what names refer to. My argument relies (...)
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  6. Peano, Frege and Russell’s Logical Influences.Kevin C. Klement - forthcoming - Forthcoming.
    This chapter clarifies that it was the works Giuseppe Peano and his school that first led Russell to embrace symbolic logic as a tool for understanding the foundations of mathematics, not those of Frege, who undertook a similar project starting earlier on. It also discusses Russell’s reaction to Peano’s logic and its influence on his own. However, the chapter also seeks to clarify how and in what ways Frege was influential on Russell’s views regarding such topics as classes, functions, meaning (...)
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  7. Higher-Order Metaphysics in Frege and Russell.Kevin C. Klement - forthcoming - In Peter Fritz & Nicholas Jones (eds.), Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter explores the metaphysical views about higher-order logic held by two individuals responsible for introducing it to philosophy: Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970). Frege understood a function at first as the remainder of the content of a proposition when one component was taken out or seen as replaceable by others, and later as a mapping between objects. His logic employed second-order quantifiers ranging over such functions, and he saw a deep division in nature between objects and functions. (...)
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  8. The limits and basis of logical tolerance: Carnap’s combination of Russell and Wittgenstein.Adam Tamas Tuboly - forthcoming - In Peter Stone (ed.), Bertrand Russell’s Life and Legacy. Vernon Press.
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  9. Susanne K. Langer and the Harvard School of Analysis.Sander Verhaegh - forthcoming - In Lona Gaikis (ed.), The Bloomsbury Handbook of Susanne K. Langer. London: Bloomsbury.
    Susanne Langer was a student at Radcliffe College between 1916 and 1926---a highly transitional period in the history of American philosophy. Intellectual generalists such as William James, John Dewey, and Josiah Royce had dominated philosophical debates at the turn of the century but the academic landscape gradually started to shift in the years after World War I. Many scholars of the new generation adopted a more piecemeal approach to philosophy---solving clearly delineated, technical puzzles using the so-called “method of logical analysis”. (...)
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  10. Bertrand Russell’s Philosophical Logic and its Logical Forms.Nikolay Milkov - 2023 - Athens Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):193-210.
    From 1901 till, at least, 1919, Russell persistently maintained that there are two kinds of logic, between which he sharply discriminated: mathematical logic and philosophical logic. In this paper, we discuss the concept of philosophical logic, as used by Russell. This was only a tentative program that Russell did not clarify in detail, so our task will be to make it explicit. We shall show that there are three (-and-a-half) kinds of Russellian philosophical logic: (i) “pure logic”; (ii) philosophical logic (...)
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  11. Russell on Propositions.Dominic Alford-Duguid & Fatema Amijee - 2022 - In Adam Russell Murray & Chris Tillman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge. pp. 188-208.
    Bertrand Russell was neither the first nor the last philosopher to engage in serious theorizing about propositions. But his work between 1903, when he published The Principles of Mathematics, and 1919, when his final lectures on logical atomism were published, remains among the most important on the subject. And its importance is not merely historical. Russell’s rapidly evolving treatment of propositions during this period was driven by his engagement with – and discovery of – puzzles that either continue to shape (...)
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  12. Rola mistycyzmu i myślenia mistycznego u Bertranda Russella.Tatiana Barkovskiy - 2022 - Przegląd Filozoficzny 122 (2):5–26.
    The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how Bertrand Russell depicts the relation of mysticism to three other areas of human activity: philosophy, science, and religion, and thus: its special role. In his essay Mysticism and Logic (1914), Russell defines mystical thinking as beliefs in (1) the existence of special insight, (2) the unity of all things, (3) the unreality of time, and (4) the effacement of the boundaries between good and evil. Although he considers full mysticism – as (...)
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  13. Denoting Concepts and Ontology in Russell's Principles of Mathematics.Wouter Adriaan Cohen - 2022 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 10 (7).
    Bertrand Russell’s _Principles of Mathematics_ (1903) gives rise to several interpretational challenges, especially concerning the theory of denoting concepts. Only relatively recently, for instance, has it been properly realised that Russell accepted denoting concepts that do not denote anything. Such empty denoting concepts are sometimes thought to enable Russell, whether he was aware of it or not, to avoid commitment to some of the problematic non-existent entities he seems to accept, such as the Homeric gods and chimeras. In this paper, (...)
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  14. Logical Form and the Development of Russell’s Logicism.Kevin C. Klement - 2022 - In F. Boccuni & A. Sereni (eds.), Origins and Varieties of Logicism. Routledge. pp. 147–166.
    Logicism is the view that mathematical truths are logical truths. But a logical truth is commonly thought to be one with a universally valid form. The form of “7 > 5” would appear to be the same as “4 > 6”. Yet one is a mathematical truth, and the other not a truth at all. To preserve logicism, we must maintain that the two either are different subforms of the same generic form, or that their forms are not at all (...)
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  15. Russell–Myhill and grounding.Boris Kment - 2022 - Analysis 82 (1):49-60.
    The Russell-Myhill paradox puts pressure on the Russellian structured view of propositions by showing that it conflicts with certain prima facie attractive ontological and logical principles. I describe several versions of RMP and argue that structurists can appeal to natural assumptions about metaphysical grounding to provide independent reasons for rejecting the ontological principles used in these paradoxes. It remains a task for future work to extend this grounding-based approach to all variants of RMP.
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  16. Wann Streit sich lohnt. Versuch über Bertrand Russell (1872–1970).Olaf L. Müller - 2022 - Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 115:N3.
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  17. Wittgenstein's Reductio.Gilad Nir - 2022 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 10 (3).
    By means of a reductio argument, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus calls into question the very idea that we can represent logical form. My paper addresses three interrelated questions: first, what conception of logical form is at issue in this argument? Second, whose conception of logic is this argument intended to undermine? And third, what could count as an adequate response to it? I show that the argument construes logical form as the universal, underlying correlation of any representation and the reality it represents. (...)
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  18. Buddhismo e senso comune. Filosofia della meditazione.Marco Simionato - 2022 - Padova PD, Italia: Padova University Press.
    In che cosa crede chi pratica la meditazione buddhista? Dare una risposta univoca e coerente è assai difficile; il Buddhismo infatti si concretizza in una molteplicità di scuole e dottrine caratterizzate da complesse logiche e metafisiche. Ci sono tuttavia delle indicazioni minimali che fungono da denominator comune per chi si accosta alla meditazione. Esse riguardano soprattutto l’assenza di punti di vista determinati, l’esperienza del tempo e la relazione di dipendenza reciproca di ogni cosa con ogni altra. Utilizzando gli strumenti della (...)
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  19. Bergsonism and the History of Analytic Philosophy.Andreas Vrahimis - 2022 - Cham: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    During the first quarter of the twentieth century, the French philosopher Henri Bergson became an international celebrity, profoundly influencing contemporary intellectual and artistic currents. While Bergsonism was fashionable, L. Susan Stebbing, Bertrand Russell, Moritz Schlick, and Rudolf Carnap launched different critical attacks against some of Bergson’s views. This book examines this series of critical responses to Bergsonism early in the history of analytic philosophy. Analytic criticisms of Bergsonism were influenced by William James, who saw Bergson as an ‘anti-intellectualist’ ally of (...)
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  20. On the gnoseologic principles of Bertrand Russell.Rafael Andrés Alemañ-Berenguer - 2021 - Naturaleza y Libertad. Revista de Estudios Interdisciplinares.
    Exposed in 1948, within his masterpiece on the scope and limits of human knowledge, the epistemological tenets that Bertrand Russell regarded as fundamental elements in the construction of scientific knowledge, are still worthy of a detailed discussion today. Given the excellence of the author, it will not be surprising to see that Russell's gnoseologic postulates, even for the present scientific view, address some of the most controversial questions still to be solved in the theory of knowledge.
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  21. Conceptual Engineering or Revisionary Conceptual Analysis? The Case of Russell's Metaphilosophy Based on Principia Mathematica's Logic.Landon Elkind - 2021 - Dialogue 60 (3):447-474.
    Conceptual engineers have made hay over the differences of their metaphilosophy from those of conceptual analysts. In this article, I argue that the differences are not as great as conceptual engineers have, perhaps rhetorically, made them seem. That is, conceptual analysts asking ‘What is X?’ questions can do much the same work that conceptual engineers can do with ‘What is X for?’ questions, at least if conceptual analysts self-understand their activity as a revisionary enterprise. I show this with a study (...)
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  22. Are Rules of Inference Superfluous? Wittgenstein vs. Frege and Russell.Gilad Nir - 2021 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):45-61.
    In Tractatus 5.132 Wittgenstein argues that inferential justification depends solely on the understanding of the premises and conclusion, and is not mediated by any further act. On this basis he argues that Frege’s and Russell’s rules of inference are “senseless” and “superfluous”. This line of argument is puzzling, since it is unclear that there could be any viable account of inference according to which no such mediation takes place. I show that Wittgenstein’s rejection of rules of inference can be motivated (...)
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  23. The Paradox of Falsehood and Non-Being.Simone Nota - 2021 - Synthesis 1 (1):7-46.
    How can we think or say what is not? If we equate what-is-not with nothing, then a thought of nothing is no thought at all; if we don’t, we are condemned to admit that what-is-not is, seemingly incurring in self-refutation. In this paper, I address this paradox through the lenses of Parmenides, Plato, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein.
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  24. Physicalisme et monisme russellien.Victor Tremblay-Baillargeon - 2021 - Ithaque 28:119-137.
    Dans cet article, je propose de défendre le monisme russellien, une théorie posant l’existence de quiddités phénoménologiques au fondement de la réalité. Je propose en particulier de montrer que le monisme russellien échappe aux objections qui en font une version inadéquate du physicalisme. Pour ce faire, j’identifie les trois raisons qui motivent le physicalisme, c’est-à-dire la parcimonie, le naturalisme et l’argument de la clôture causale, et j’argumente qu’il faut considérer que le monisme russellien satisfait ces trois motivations. Ainsi, si j’ai (...)
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  25. Why did Frege reject the theory of types?Wim Vanrie - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (3):517-536.
    I investigate why Frege rejected the theory of types, as Russell presented it to him in their correspondence. Frege claims that it commits one to violations of the law of excluded middle, but this complaint seems to rest on a dogmatic refusal to take Russell’s proposal seriously on its own terms. What is at stake is not so much the truth of a law of logic, but the structure of the hierarchy of the logical categories, something Frege seems to neglect. (...)
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  26. Russell and Schlick on Work and Play.Andreas Vrahimis - 2021 - The Bertrand Russell Society Bulletin 163:52-60.
    The concepts of work, labour, leisure, and play have been widely debated by the social sciences. By contrast, most canonical figures in the history of analytic philosophy have written very little, if anything, on the topic. One of the few exceptional discussions of the concept of labour and its history can be found in Bertrand Russell’s popular work from the 1930s, and more specifically his well-known essay ‘In Praise of Idleness’. In the essay, Russell attempts a spirited defence of a (...)
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  27. Russell reading Bergson.Andreas Vrahimis - 2021 - In Mark Sinclair & Yaron Wolf (eds.), The Bergsonian Mind. Oxon: Routledge. pp. 350-366.
    This chapter examines Bertrand Russell’s various confrontations with Bergson’s work. Russell’s meetings with Bergson during 1911 would be followed in 1912 by the publication of Russell’s earliest polemical pieces. His 1912 review of Bergson’s Laughter ridicules the effort to develop a philosophical account of humour on the basis of some formula. In his 1912 “The Philosophy of Bergson”, Russell develops a series of objections against Bergson’s accounts of number, space, and duration. Bergson’s position is defended against Russell’s onslaught by H. (...)
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  28. Ludwig’s Punch and Bertie’s Comeback. Reconciling Russell and Wittgenstein on the Content of Desires.Peter Baumann - 2020 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 40 (2):132-149.
    Desires are contentful mental states. But what determines the content of a desire? Two different classic answers were proposed by Russell and by Wittgenstein, starting in the 1910s. Russell proposed a behaviorist account according to which the content of the desire is fixed by the type of state that puts an end to the relevant kind of behavior which was triggered by some initial discomfort. The desire’s content consists in its “satisfaction conditions”. Wittgenstein criticized such an account for neglecting the (...)
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  29. Genealogy of Algorithms: Datafication as Transvaluation.Virgil W. Brower - 2020 - le Foucaldien 6 (1):1-43.
    This article investigates religious ideals persistent in the datafication of information society. Its nodal point is Thomas Bayes, after whom Laplace names the primal probability algorithm. It reconsiders their mathematical innovations with Laplace's providential deism and Bayes' singular theological treatise. Conceptions of divine justice one finds among probability theorists play no small part in the algorithmic data-mining and microtargeting of Cambridge Analytica. Theological traces within mathematical computation are emphasized as the vantage over large numbers shifts to weights beyond enumeration in (...)
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  30. Hegel's Proto-Modernist Conception of Philosophy as Science.Zeyad El Nabolsy - 2020 - Problemata: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 11 (4):81-107.
    I argue that the reception of Hegel in the sub-field of history and philosophy of science has been in part impeded by a misunderstanding of his mature metaphilosophical views. I take Alan Richardson’s influential account of the rise of scientific philosophy as an illustration of such misunderstanding, I argue that the mature Hegel’s metaphilosophical views place him much closer to the philosophers who are commonly taken as paradigms of scientific philosophy than it is commonly thought. Hegel is commonly presented as (...)
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  31. Arnošt Kolman’s Critique of Mathematical Fetishism.Jakub Mácha & Jan Zouhar - 2020 - In Radek Schuster (ed.), The Vienna Circle in Czechoslovakia. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 135-150.
    Arnošt Kolman (1892–1979) was a Czech mathematician, philosopher and Communist official. In this paper, we would like to look at Kolman’s arguments against logical positivism which revolve around the notion of the fetishization of mathematics. Kolman derives his notion of fetishism from Marx’s conception of commodity fetishism. Kolman is aiming to show the fact that an entity (system, structure, logical construction) acquires besides its real existence another formal existence. Fetishism means the fantastic detachment of the physical characteristics of real things (...)
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  32. Russell’s Conception of Propositional Attitudes in Relation to Pragmatism.Nikolay Milkov - 2020 - An Anthology of Philosophical Studies 14:117-128.
    The conventional wisdom has it that between 1905 and 1919 Russell was critical to pragmatism. In particular, in two essays written in 1908–9, he sharply attacked the pragmatist theory of truth, emphasizing that truth is not relative to human practice. In fact, however, Russell was much more indebted to the pragmatists, in particular to William James, as usually believed. For example, he borrowed from James two key concepts of his new epistemology: sense-data, and the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and (...)
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  33. "Philosophie ist Möglichkeitswissenschaft" - Zur Beziehung von Philosophie, Wissenschaft und logischer Analyse bei Russell.Thomas Mormann - 2020 - Aufklärung Und Kritik 2020 (1):51 - 64.
    Bis heute wird Russells Philosophie nicht selten der Vorwurf gemacht, es fehle ihr an Kohärenz und Zusammenhang. Russell wird als ein Autor charakterisiert, der alle paar Jahre eine neue alternative Philosophie vorgeschlagen habe. In der vorliegenden Arbeit soll dagegen argumentiert werden, daß diese These auf einer zu oberflächlichen Ein–schätzung von Russells Denken beruht. Seine Philosophie verfügte sehr wohl über eine Einheit, die durch ihre charakteristische einheitsstiftende Methode vermittelt wurde. Dies war die Methode der logischen Analyse, die sich als Invariante in (...)
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  34. Bertrand Russell on Logical Constructions: Matter as a Logical Construction from Sense-data.Mika Suojanen - 2020 - AL-Mukhatabat 36:13-33.
    The notion of logical construction was used by Bertrand Russell in the early 20th century, which originally comes from A. N. Whitehead. Russell said that matter as a mind-independent thing can only be known by description. He also argued that matter is a logical construction of sense-data. However, this leads to an incoherent view of the direct or indirect connection between a mind and the external world. The problem examining is whether a collapsing house is a logical construction of the (...)
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  35. Russell's Logicism.Kevin C. Klement - 2019 - In Russell Wahl (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Bertrand Russell. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 151-178.
    Bertrand Russell was one of the best-known proponents of logicism: the theory that mathematics reduces to, or is an extension of, logic. Russell argued for this thesis in his 1903 The Principles of Mathematics and attempted to demonstrate it formally in Principia Mathematica (PM 1910–1913; with A. N. Whitehead). Russell later described his work as a further “regressive” step in understanding the foundations of mathematics made possible by the late 19th century “arithmetization” of mathematics and Frege’s logical definitions of arithmetical (...)
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  36. Introduction to G.E. Moore's Unpublished Review of The Principles of Mathematics.Kevin C. Klement - 2019 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 38:131-164.
    Several interesting themes emerge from G. E. Moore’s previously unpub­lished review of _The Principles of Mathematics_. These include a worry concerning whether mathematical notions are identical to purely logical ones, even if coextensive logical ones exist. Another involves a conception of infinity based on endless series neglected in the Principles but arguably involved in Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise. Moore also questions the scope of Russell’s notion of material implication, and other aspects of Russell’s claim that mathematics reduces (...)
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  37. A Brief Introduction to Analytic Philosophy.Oleksandr Kulyk - 2019 - Dnipro: LIRA.
    This brief introduction is for people who want to know the leading approaches to philosophy in the twentieth century in English-speaking countries but do not have much time to study them. The book contains texts of lectures and quizzes with explained answers. By the end of this book, you will understand what analysis is and how to practice it in a philosophical way. Moreover, you will be able to talk confidently about some of the great ideas of such philosophers as (...)
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  38. Did Russell experience an epiphany in 1911?Alan Kenneth Schwerin - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (1):1-17.
    Bertrand Russell’s conception of philosophy evolved dramatically in 1911 — the year he fell in love with Lady Ottoline Morrell. For many years Russell had been an ardent advocate of the view that philosophers ought to look for truths that are certain. The co-author of Principia Mathematica altered his commitment to certainty in philosophy in 1911. An analysis of his published views and correspondence from this time strongly suggests that the radical transformation was induced by an epiphany brought about by (...)
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  39. Other minds and God: Russell and Stout on James and Schiller.Tim Button - 2018 - In Maria Baghramian & Sarin Marchetti (eds.), Pragmatism and the European Traditions: Encounters with analytic philosophy and phenomenology before the great divide. London: Routledge. pp. 86-109.
    In 1907–8, Russell and Stout presented an objection against James and Schiller, to which both James and Schiller replied. In this paper, I shall revisit their transatlantic exchange. Doing so will yield a better understanding of Schiller’s relationship to a worryingly solipsistic brand of phenomenalism. It will also allow us to appreciate a crucial difference between Schiller and James; a difference which James explicitly downplayed.
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  40. A Brief Survey of Russell’s Notion of Acquaintance.Luis G. Castro M. - 2018 - Episteme NS: Revista Del Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad Central de Venezuela 38 (1-2):37-52.
    The aim of this essay is to analyze the concept of acquaintance in the philosophy of Bertrand Russell. First, Russell’s epistemological program and works are presented in a general manner. Then, the concept of acquaintance is defined and characterized, as well as the so-called principle of acquaintance. After that, acquaintance is placed in Russell’s epistemology as the core of his theory of knowledge. Finally, I will make some critical remarks concerning the role of acquaintance in Russell’s epistemological framework.
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  41. Russell and the Temporal Contiguity of Causes and Effects.Graham Clay - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1245-1264.
    There are some necessary conditions on causal relations that seem to be so trivial that they do not merit further inquiry. Many philosophers assume that the requirement that there could be no temporal gaps between causes and their effects is such a condition. Bertrand Russell disagrees. In this paper, an in-depth discussion of Russell’s argument against this necessary condition is the centerpiece of an analysis of what is at stake when one accepts or denies that there can be temporal gaps (...)
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  42. On Russell's Logical Atomism.Landon D. C. Elkind - 2018 - In Landon D. C. Elkind & Gregory Landini (eds.), The Philosophy of Logical Atomism: A Centenary Reappraisal. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 3-37.
    I characterize and argue against the standard interpretation of logical atomism. The argument against this reading is historical: the standard interpretation of logical atomism (1) fails to explain how the view is inspired by nineteenth-century developments in mathematics, (2) fails to explain how logic is central to logical atomism, and (3) fails to explain how logical atomism is a revolutionary and new "scientific philosophy." In short, the standard interpretation is a bad history of logical atomism. A novel interpretation of the (...)
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  43. Hume und Russell über Grenzen des Empirismus.Reinhard Fiedler - 2018 - Aufklärung Und Kritik 4 (2018):118-124.
    This is a short reminder that Bertrand Russell suggested a number of a priori postulates which are to serve as foundation for an empiricist philsophy.
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  44. Hume und Russell über Grenzen des Empirismus.Reinhard Fiedler - 2018 - Aufklärung Und Kritik 4 (25. Jahrhgang):118 - 124.
    The article gives a short characterization of Russell's solution to Hume's problem: empirical postulates.
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  45. Russell’s Logical Construction of the World.Peter J. Graham - 2018 - In Diego Machua & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. New York, USA: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 454-466.
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  46. Russell on Ontological Fundamentality and Existence.Kevin C. Klement - 2018 - In Landon D. C. Elkind & Gregory Landini (eds.), The Philosophy of Logical Atomism: A Centenary Reappraisal. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 155–79.
    Russell is often taken as a forerunner of the Quinean position that “to be is to be the value of a bound variable”, whereupon the ontological commitment of a theory is given by what it quantifies over. Among other reasons, Russell was among the first to suggest that all existence statements should be analyzed by means of existential quantification. That there was more to Russell’s metaphysics than what existential quantifications come out as true is obvious in the earlier period where (...)
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  47. Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Language.Oleksandr Kulyk - 2018 - Днипро, Днепропетровская область, Украина, 49000: LIRA.
    This is an instructor’s manual with student exercises for the Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Language course. It is intended to assist the instructor in teaching the subject to students for whom English is a second language. -/- This manual begins with a chapter that describes the types of learning activities during this course. Next are topic chapters, each of which has four sections: a synopsis of the lecture on the topic; a lecture lesson worksheet with tasks; a seminar lesson (...)
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  48. On the Genealogy of Universals: The Metaphysical Origins of Analytic Philosophy.Fraser MacBride - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The concepts of particular and universal have grown so familiar that their significance has become difficult to discern, like coins that have been passed back and forth too many times, worn smooth so their values can no longer be read. On the Genealogy of Universals seeks to overcome our sense of over-familiarity with these concepts by providing a case study of their evolution during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, a study that shows how the history of these (...)
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  49. Priority and Unity in Frege and Wittgenstein.Oliver Thomas Spinney - 2018 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 6 (5).
    In the following article I intend to examine the problem of the unity of the proposition in Russell, Frege, and Wittgenstein. My chief aim will be to draw attention to the distinction between Russell’s conception of propositional constituents, on the one hand, with Frege and Wittgenstein’s on the other. My focus will be on Russell’s view of terms as independent, propositions being built up out of these building blocks, compared with Frege and Wittgenstein’s ‘top down’ approach. Furthermore, I will argue (...)
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  50. Russell on Introspection and Self-Knowledge.Donovan Wishon - 2018 - In Russell Wahl (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Bertrand Russell. New York, NY, USA: pp. 256-285.
    This chapter examines Bertrand Russell's developing views--roughly from 1911 to 1918--on the nature of introspective knowledge and subjects' most basic knowledge of themselves as themselves. It argues that Russell's theory of introspection distinguishes between direct awareness of individual psychological objects and features, the presentation of psychological complexes involving those objects and features, and introspective judgments which aim to correspond with them. It also explores his transition from believing that subjects enjoy introspective self-acquaintance, to believing that they only know themselves by (...)
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