On Free Will and No-conspiracy

In Tilman Sauer & Adrian Wüthrich (eds.), New Vistas on Old Problems: Recent Approaches to the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. Max Planck Research Library for the History and Development of Knowledge. pp. 87-102 (2013)
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In this paper, I challenge the widespread view that Measurement Independence adequately represents the requirement that EPR experimenters have free will. Measurement Independence is most commonly taken as a necessary condition for free will. A number of implicit assumptions can be identified in this regard, all of which can be challenged on their own grounds. As a result, I conclude that Measurement Independence-type conditions are not to be justified by appealing to the preservation of the EPR experimenters’ free will.
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