Realism and the Epistemic Objectivity of Science

Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):5-20 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The paper presents a realist account of the epistemic objectivity of science. Epistemic objectivity is distinguished from ontological objectivity and the objectivity of truth. As background, T.S. Kuhn’s idea that scientific theory-choice is based on shared scientific values with a role for both objective and subjective factors is discussed. Kuhn’s values are epistemologically ungrounded, hence provide a minimal sense of objectivity. A robust account of epistemic objectivity on which methodological norms are reliable means of arriving at the truth is presented. The problem remains that deliberative judgement is required to determine the relevance and relative significance of a range of methodological norms. A role is sketched for cognitive virtues which may be exercised in the course of the deliberative judgement.

Author's Profile

Howard Sankey
University of Melbourne

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-01-28

Downloads
619 (#24,409)

6 months
111 (#31,987)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?