Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1):136-155 (2021)
AbstractThere are two families of influential and stubborn puzzles that many theories of aboutness (intentionality) face: underdetermination puzzles and puzzles concerning representations that appear to be about things that do not exist. I propose an approach that elegantly avoids both kinds of puzzle. The central idea is to explain aboutness (the relation supposed to stand between thoughts and terms and their objects) in terms of relations of co-aboutness (the relation of being about the same thing that stands between the thoughts and terms themselves).
Archival historyFirst archival date: 2020-11-10
Latest version: 2 (2021-03-03)
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