Being Called Names: The Predicative Attributive Account

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A recent defence of analyzing names as predicates that relies on a calling relation to explain their meanings,an account developed by Fara, is claimed to escape the problems afflicting standard meta-linguistic analyses. For Fara, this is because the calling relation itself is not essentially meta-linguistic; there are attributive uses of the calling relation as well. Distinguishing between meta-linguistic and attributive notions of calling is supposed to disperse with the common objection to calling accounts, specifically, Kripke's objection that these kinds of accounts cannot be informative. I argue that while the account may be informative in some superficial sense, it does not in fact increase our understanding of acts of naming. Indeed, I offer an objection to the account that shows that it cannot be the correct account of acts of naming, and offer a different analysis of its nature relying on the idea of meta-linguistic performatives to explain how individuals get named.
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 54 (2019-02-23)
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References found in this work BETA
Names Are Predicates.Delia Graff Fara - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (1):59-117.
Naming and Necessity.Kripke, Saul A.

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The Importance of Being Ernesto. Reference, Truth and Logical Form.Bianchi, A.; Morato, V. & Spolaore, G. (eds.)

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