Concepts, conceptions and self-knowledge

Erkenntnis (y) (2019)
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Abstract
Content externalism implies first, that there is a distinction between concepts and conceptions, and second, that there is a distinction between thoughts and states of mind. In this paper, I argue for a novel theory of self-knowledge: the partial-representation theory of self-knowledge, according to which the self-ascription of a thought is authoritative when it is based on a con-scious, occurrent thought in virtue of which it partially represents an underlying state of mind.
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2019
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First archival date: 2019-03-13
Latest version: 2 (2019-03-15)
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2019-02-15

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