Concepts, conceptions and self-knowledge

Erkenntnis (y) (2019)
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Abstract

Content externalism implies first, that there is a distinction between concepts and conceptions, and second, that there is a distinction between thoughts and states of mind. In this paper, I argue for a novel theory of self-knowledge: the partial-representation theory of self-knowledge, according to which the self-ascription of a thought is authoritative when it is based on a con-scious, occurrent thought in virtue of which it partially represents an underlying state of mind.

Author's Profile

Sarah Sawyer
University of Sussex

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