Acts of Desire

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Abstract
Act-based theories of content hold that propositions are identical to acts of predication that we perform in thought and talk. To undergo an occurrent thought with a particular content just is to perform the act of predication that individuates that content. But identifying the content of a thought with the performance of an act of predication makes it difficult to explain the intentionality of bouletic mental activity, like wanting and desiring. In this paper, I argue that this difficulty is insurmountable: the contents of occurrent desires cannot be determined by acts of predication.
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SCHAOD-12
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Archival date: 2019-07-22
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The Reference Book.Hawthorne, John & Manley, David
Thinking is Believing.Mandelbaum, Eric

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2019-07-22

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