Beyond the Fregean myth: the value of logical values

In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Objects of Inquiry in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 245--260 (2010)
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One of the most prominent myths in analytic philosophy is the so- called “Fregean Axiom”, according to which the reference of a sentence is a truth value. In contrast to this referential semantics, a use-based formal semantics will be constructed in which the logical value of a sentence is not its putative referent but the information it conveys. Let us call by “Question Answer Semantics” (thereafter: QAS) the corresponding formal semantics: a non-Fregean many-valued logic, where the meaning of any sentence is an ordered n-tupled of yes-no answers to corresponding questions. A sample of philosophical problems will be approached in order to justify the relevance of QAS. These include: (1) illocutionary forces, and the logical analysis of speech-acts; (2) the variety of logical negations, and their characterization in terms of restricted ranges of logical values; (3) change in meaning, and the use of dynamic oppositions for belief sets.
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