Epistemic Planning, Epistemic Internalism, and Luminosity

In Conor Mchugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2018)
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In in this paper, I make use of an “doxastic planning model” of epistemic evaluation to argue for a form of epistemic internalism. In doing so, I begin by responding to a recent argument of Schoenfield’s against my previous attempt to develop such an argument. In doing so, I distinguish a variety of ways that argument might be understood, and discuss how both internalists and externalists might make use of the ideas within it. Then I argue that, despite these complexities, the doxastic planning model continues to support a modest form of epistemic internalism. I conclude by showing that, far from conflicting with “anti-luminosity” arguments in epistemology, this form of internalism is best understood as a natural reaction to these arguments.

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Karl Schafer
University of Texas at Austin


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