Intention as Belief

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):318-334 (2021)
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Abstract

What’s the relationship between (i) intending to do something, (ii) believing that you are going to do this, and (iii) its being the case that you are going to do the thing in question? I propose a position on which all three categories, correctly understood, amount in the fundamental case to the very same thing. The belief that constitutes future-directed intention, when strong, likewise constitutes one as having a real tendency to act in the intended way.

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John Schwenkler
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

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