Kant: constitutivism as capacities-first philosophy

Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):177-193 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” program within metaethics. But is Kant best read as pursuing a constitutivist approach to meta- normative questions? And if so, in what sense? In this essay, I’ll argue that we can best answer these questions by considering them in the context of a broader issue – namely, how Kant understands the proper methodology for philosophy in general. The result of this investigation will be that, while Kant can indeed be read as a sort of constitutivist, his constitutivism is ultimately just one instance of a much more general approach to philosophy – which treats as fundamental our basic, self-conscious rational capacities. Thus, to truly understand why and how Kant is a constitutivist, we need to consider this question within the context of his more fundamental commitment to “capacities-first philosophy”.
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SCHKCA-6
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-02-08
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-02-08

Total views
752 ( #7,734 of 65,693 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
133 ( #4,430 of 65,693 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.