Logic in Opposition

Studia Humana 2 (3):31-45 (2013)
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Abstract

It is claimed hereby that, against a current view of logic as a theory of consequence, opposition is a basic logical concept that can be used to define consequence itself. This requires some substantial changes in the underlying framework, including: a non-Fregean semantics of questions and answers, instead of the usual truth-conditional semantics; an extension of opposition as a relation between any structured objects; a definition of oppositions in terms of basic negation. Objections to this claim will be reviewed.

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Fabien Schang
Université de Lorraine (PhD)

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