Phenomenal Dispositions

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In this paper, I argue against a dispositional account of the intentionality of belief states that has been endorsed by proponents of phenomenal intentionality. Specifically, I argue that the best characterization of a dispositional account of intentionality is one that takes beliefs to be dispositions to undergo occurrent judgments. I argue that there are cases where an agent believes that p, but fails to have a disposition to judge that p.
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Archival date: 2018-07-25
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References found in this work BETA
Alief and Belief.Gendler, Tamar Szabó
Finkish Dispositions.Lewis, David K.
Thinking is Believing.Mandelbaum, Eric

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Acts of Desire.Schiller, Henry Ian

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