Phenomenal dispositions

Synthese 197 (9):3969-3980 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper, I argue against a dispositional account of the intentionality of belief states that has been endorsed by proponents of phenomenal intentionality. Specifically, I argue that the best characterization of a dispositional account of intentionality is one that takes beliefs to be dispositions to undergo occurrent judgments. I argue that there are cases where an agent believes that p, but fails to have a disposition to judge that p.
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SCHPD-17
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-07-25
View other versions
Added to PP
2018-07-25

Downloads
616 (#12,102)

6 months
41 (#20,314)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?