Probleme des ‚kantianischen‘ Nonkonzeptualismus im Hinblick auf die B-Deduktion

Kant-Studien 106 (4):561-580 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
:Recently, Allais, Hanna and others have argued that Kant is a nonconceptualist about intuition and that intuitions refer objectively, independently of the functions of the understanding. Kantian conceptualists have responded, which the nonconceptualists also cite as textual evidence for their reading) that this view conflicts with the central goal of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: to argue that all intuitions are subject to the categories. I argue that the conceptualist reading of KrV, A 89 ff./B 122 ff. is unfounded. Further, I argue that the nonconceptualists are wrong to believe that intuitions as such refer objectively and that they are mistaken about the relation between figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SCHPDQ
Revision history
First archival date: 2016-03-16
Latest version: 4 (2019-04-19)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
A Nonconceptualist Reading of the B-Deduction.Pereira, Roberto Horácio de Sá

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2014-01-16

Total views
241 ( #14,335 of 43,036 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
51 ( #13,098 of 43,036 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.