Perceptual Particularity

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Abstract
Perception grounds demonstrative reference, yields singular thoughts, and fixes the reference of singular terms. Moreover, perception provides us with knowledge of particulars in our environment and justifies singular thoughts about particulars. How does perception play these cognitive and epistemic roles in our lives? I address this question by exploring the fundamental nature of perceptual experience. I argue that perceptual states are constituted by particulars and discuss epistemic, ontological, psychologistic, and semantic approaches to account for perceptual particularity.
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SCHPP-21
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First archival date: 2016-03-28
Latest version: 2 (2016-09-02)
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
The Reference Book.Hawthorne, John & Manley, David

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Citations of this work BETA
Introduction: Perception Without Representation.Wilson, Keith & Locatelli, Roberta

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2015-12-16

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