The Explanatory Merits of Reasons-First Epistemology
In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schröder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York: pp. 75-91 (2020)
Abstract
I present an explanatory argument for the reasons-first view: It is superior to knowledge-first views in particular in that it can both explain the specific epistemic role of perception and account for the shape and extent of epistemic justification.
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Archival date: 2021-01-05
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2020-12-30
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147 ( #39,217 of 65,768 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
87 ( #7,996 of 65,768 )
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