The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to do

Journal of Social Ontology (1):91-100 (2020)
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Abstract
In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-bearers. Producing a unified theory of group obligations that reflects our messy social reality is challenging and this ‘three-sizes-fit-all’ approach promises clarity but does not always keep that promise. I suggest considering the epistemic level as primary in determining collective obligations, allowing for more fluidity than the proposed tripartite ontology of collectives, coalitions and combinations.
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SCHTEO-157
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Archival date: 2020-08-25
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2020-08-25

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