Why We Should Promote Irrationality

Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4):605-615 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The author defends the claim that there are cases in which we should promote irrationality by arguing (1) that it is sometimes better to be in an irrational state of mind, and (2) that we can often influence our state of mind via our actions. The first claim is supported by presenting cases of irrational _belief_ and by countering a common line of argument associated with William K. Clifford, who defended the idea that having an irrational belief is always worse than having a rational one. In support of the second claim, the author then explains how the control we have over our beliefs could look like. In conclusion, the author suggests that the argument of this essay is not restricted to the irrationality of beliefs, but can be applied to irrational states of mind in general. In an outlook on the “ethics of belief” debate, the author points out that the argument of this essay need not conflict with evidentialism, but does so when combined with another plausible claim about the meaning of doxastic ought-statements.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SCHWWS-7
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-12-07
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2017-10-29

Total views
114 ( #22,252 of 39,939 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #18,864 of 39,939 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.