On Privileging God's Moral Goodness

Faith and Philosophy 23 (4):409-422 (2006)
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According to Eric Funkhouser, omnipotence and necessary moral perfection (what Funkhouser calls "impeccability") are not compatible. Funkhouser gives two arguments for this claim. In this paper, I argue that neither of Funkhouser's arguments is sound. The traditional theist can reasonably claim that, contra Funkhouser, (i) there is no possible being who possesses all of God's attributes sans impeccability, and (ii) the fact that there are things that God cannot do does not entail that God lacks omnipotence. Armed with (i) and (ii), the theist has all that is needed to refute Funkhouser's arguments.

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Thomas Senor
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville


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