Modal Meinongianism, Russell’s Paradox, and the Language/Metalanguage Distinction
Polish Journal of Philosophy (2):63-78 (2013)
Abstract
The subject of my article is the principle of characterization – the most controversial principle of Meinong’s Theory of Objects. The aim of this text is twofold. First of all, I would like to show that Russell’s well-known objection to Meinong’s Theory of Objects can be reformulated against a new modal interpretation of Meinongianism that is presented mostly by Graham Priest. Secondly, I would like to propose a strategy which gives uncontroversial restriction to the principle of characterization and which allows to avoid Russell’s argument. The strategy is based on the distinction between object- and metalanguage, and it applies to modal Meinongianism as well as to other so-called Meinongian theories.
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2013
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1897-1652
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SENMMR
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2014-01-18
Total views
338 ( #15,612 of 55,821 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
44 ( #17,492 of 55,821 )
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