Realizm modalny i okresy warunkowe z niemożliwymi poprzednikami [Modal Realism and Counterpossibles]

Filozofia Nauki 22 (4) (2014)
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To solve the problem of counterpossibles, many philosophers have been arguing that one needs to invoke impossible worlds. This extension of the ontology of modality should save the analysis of counterfactuals from being insensitive to the problem of counterpossibles. Since theories of impossible worlds are extensions of original accounts of modalities, it is worth stressing that proper analyses of counterpossibles should not weaken the latter.In this paper I argue that these theories of impossible wolrds, which are based on D. Lewis' modal realism - Extended Modal Realism and Hybrid Modal Realism - might be consider as either an unattractive for modal realists or insufficient for analyzing counterpossibles.
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
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