Fictional Truth in Digital Cinema: A Criticism against John Dilworth

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In digital cinema, the ambiguity in the concept of representation asks us: How do moving pictures represent fictional objects? I am more concerned in the veracity of fictional objects than the representational theory of how fictional objects are generated. I claim that John Dilworth’s framework is uncritical, therefore, I will adopt an account of truth in fiction according to David Lewis. The purposes of this paper are: (1) to criticize John Dilworth’s framework, and (2) to provide Lewis’s theory as an alternative solution in understanding the veracity of fictional objects.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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