A Better Disjunctivist Response to the 'New Evil Genius' Challenge

Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):101-125 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper aims for a more robust epistemological disjunctivism (ED) by offering on its behalf a new and better response to the ‘new evil genius’ problem. The first section articulates the ‘new evil genius challenge’ (NEG challenge) to ED, specifying its two components: the ‘first-order’ and ‘diagnostic’ problems for ED. The first-order problem challenges proponents of ED to offer some explanation of the intuition behind the thought that your radically deceived duplicate is no less justified than you are for adopting her perceptual beliefs. In the second section, I argue that 'blamelessness' explanations are inadequate to the task and offer better explanations in their place—that of ‘trait-level virtue’ and ‘reasonability’. The diagnostic problem challenges proponents of ED to explain why it is that classical internalists disagree with them about how to interpret 'new evil genius' considerations. The proponent of ED owes some error theory. I tackle this problem in the third section, arguing that classical internalists overlook disjunctivist interpretations of new evil genius intuitions owing to a mistaken commitment to a ‘vindicatory’ explanation of perceptual knowledge.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
Reprint years
2017
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SHAABD-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-04-28
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-04-28

Total views
312 ( #15,723 of 53,494 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
65 ( #8,982 of 53,494 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.