Approximate Truth, Quasi-Factivity, and Evidence

Acta Analytica 30 (3):249-266 (2015)
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Abstract
The main question addressed in this paper is whether some false sentences can constitute evidence for the truth of other propositions. In this paper it is argued that there are good reasons to suspect that at least some false propositions can constitute evidence for the truth of certain other contingent propositions. The paper also introduces a novel condition concerning propositions that constitute evidence that explains a ubiquitous evidential practice and it contains a defense of a particular condition concerning the possession of evidence. The core position adopted here then is that false propositions that are approximately true reports of measurements can constitute evidence for the truth of other propositions. So, it will be argued that evidence is only quasi-factive in this very specific sense
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Archival date: 2018-07-17
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Fantl, Jeremy & McGrath, Matthew
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Knowledge and Action.Hawthorne, John & Stanley, Jason

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Citations of this work BETA
Inferentialism, Degrees of Commitment, and Ampliative Reasoning.de Donato, Rodríguez Xavier; Zamora, Bonilla Jesús & González De Prado Salas, Javier

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