Bayesianism, convergence and social epistemology

Episteme 5 (2):pp. 203-219 (2008)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Following the standard practice in sociology, cultural anthropology and history, sociologists, historians of science and some philosophers of science define scientific communities as groups with shared beliefs, values and practices. In this paper it is argued that in real cases the beliefs of the members of such communities often vary significantly in important ways. This has rather dire implications for the convergence defense against the charge of the excessive subjectivity of subjective Bayesianism because that defense requires that communities of Bayesian inquirers share a significant set of modal beliefs. The important implication is then that given the actual variation in modal beliefs across individuals, either Bayesians cannot claim that actual theories have been objectively confirmed or they must accept that such theories have been confirmed relative only to epistemically insignificant communities
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
First archival date: 2018-07-17
Latest version: 1 (2018-07-17)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 37 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
93 ( #26,981 of 42,401 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #31,114 of 42,401 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.