Davidson's no-priority thesis in defending the Turing Test

Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 32:456-461 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Turing does not provide an explanation for substituting the original question of his test – i.e., “Can machines think?” with “Can a machine pass the imitation game?” – resulting in an argumentative gap in his main thesis. In this article, I argue that a positive answer to the second question would mean attributing the ability of linguistic interactions to machines; while a positive answer to the original question would mean attributing the ability of thinking to machines. In such a situation, defending the Turing Test requires establishing a relationship between thought and language. In this regard, Davidson's no-priority theory is presented as an approach for defending the test.

Author's Profile


Added to PP

324 (#39,349)

6 months
63 (#44,682)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?