Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Internalist Challenge

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Abstract
The paper highlights how a popular version of epistemological disjunctivism (Pritchard 2012, 2016) labours under a kind of ‘internalist challenge’—a challenge that seems to have gone largely unacknowledged by disjunctivists. This is the challenge to vindicate the supposed ‘internalist insight’ that disjunctivists claim their view does well to protect (cf. Littlejohn forthcoming, 2015). The paper argues that if we advance disjunctivism within a context that recognizes a distinction between merely functional and judgmental belief (Sosa 2015), we get a view that easily overcomes the internalist challenge.
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Archival date: 2017-12-05
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2017-12-05

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