Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Internalist Challenge

American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):385-396 (2019)
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Abstract

The paper highlights how a popular version of epistemological disjunctivism labors under a kind of 'internalist challenge'—a challenge that seems to have gone largely unacknowledged by disjunctivists. This is the challenge to vindicate the supposed 'internalist insight' that disjunctivists claim their view does well to protect. The paper argues that if we advance disjunctivism within a context that recognizes a distinction between merely functional and judgmental belief, we get a view that easily overcomes the internalist challenge.

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Kegan Shaw
University of Edinburgh

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