Some epistemological concerns about dissociative identity disorder and diagnostic practices in psychology

Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):1-29 (2005)
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Abstract

In this paper we argue that dissociative identity disorder (DID) is best interpreted as a causal model of a (possible) post-traumatic psychological process, as a mechanical model of an abnormal psychological condition. From this perspective we examine and criticize the evidential status of DID, and we demonstrate that there is really no good reason to believe that anyone has ever suffered from DID so understood. This is so because the proponents of DID violate basic methodological principles of good causal modeling. When every ounce of your concentration is fixed upon blasting a winged pig out of the sky, you do not question its species' ontological status. James Morrow, City of Truth (1990)

Author Profiles

Michael Shaffer
Gustavus Adolphus College
Jeffrey Shane Oakley
University of North Carolina at Wilmington

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