Results for 'Disorder'

210 found
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  1. Personal Autonomy, Decisional Capacity, and Mental Disorder.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2012 - In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press.
    In this Introduction, I situate the underlying project “Autonomy and Mental Disorder” with reference to current debates on autonomy in moral and political philosophy, and the philosophy of action. I then offer an overview of the individual contributions. More specifically, I begin by identifying three points of convergence in the debates at issue, stating that autonomy is: 1) a fundamentally liberal concept; 2) an agency concept and; 3) incompatible with (severe) mental disorder. Next, I explore, in the context (...)
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  2.  60
    In What Sense Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders? Explicating the Concept of Mental Disorder Within RDoC.Marko Jurjako & Luca Malatesti - 2020 - Phenomenology and Mind 18:182-198.
    Recently there has been a trend of moving towards biological and neurocognitive based classifications of mental disorders that is motivated by a dissatisfaction with the syndrome-based classifications of mental disorders. The Research Domain Criteria (indicated with the acronym RDoC) represents a bold and systematic attempt to foster this advancement. However, RDoC faces theoretical and conceptual issues that need to be addressed. Some of these difficulties emerge when we reflect on the plausible reading of the slogan “mental disorders are brain disorders”, (...)
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  3. Is Borderline Personality Disorder a Moral or Clinical Condition? Assessing Charland’s Argument From Treatment.Greg Horne - 2014 - Neuroethics 7 (2):215-226.
    Louis Charland has argued that the Cluster B personality disorders, including borderline personality disorder, are primarily moral rather than clinical conditions. Part of his argument stems from reflections on effective treatment of borderline personality disorder. In the argument from treatment, he claims that successful treatment of all Cluster B personality disorders requires a positive change in a patient’s moral character. Based on this claim, he concludes (1) that these disorders are, at root, deficits in moral character, and (2) (...)
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  4. Psychiatry Beyond the Brain: Externalism, Mental Health, and Autistic Spectrum Disorder.Tom Roberts, Joel Krueger & Shane Glackin - 2019 - Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 26 (3):E-51-E68.
    Externalist theories hold that a comprehensive understanding of mental disorder cannot be achieved unless we attend to factors that lie outside of the head: neural explanations alone will not fully capture the complex dependencies that exist between an individual’s psychiatric condition and her social, cultural, and material environment. Here, we firstly offer a taxonomy of ways in which the externalist viewpoint can be understood, and unpack its commitments concerning the nature and physical realization of mental disorder. Secondly, we (...)
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  5. The Phenomenology of Deep Brain Stimulation-Induced Changes in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Patients: An Enactive Affordance-Based Model.Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld, Martin Stokhof & Damiaan Denys - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7:1-14.
    People suffering from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) do things they do not want to do, and/or they think things they do not want to think. In about 10 percent of OCD patients, none of the available treatment options is effective. A small group of these patients is currently being treated with deep brain stimulation (DBS). Deep brain stimulation involves the implantation of electrodes in the brain. These electrodes give a continuous electrical pulse to the brain area in which they are (...)
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  6. Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation on the Lived Experience of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Patients.Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld, Martin Stokhof & Damiaan Denys - 2015 - PLoS ONE 10 (8):1-29.
    Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is a relatively new, experimental treatment for patients suffering from treatment-refractory Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). The effects of treatment are typically assessed with psychopathological scales that measure the amount of symptoms. However, clinical experience indicates that the effects of DBS are not limited to symptoms only: patients for instance report changes in perception, feeling stronger and more confident, and doing things unreflectively. Our aim is to get a better overview of the whole variety of changes (...)
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  7. Self-Concept Through the Diagnostic Looking Glass: Narratives and Mental Disorder.Şerife Tekin - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):357-380.
    This paper explores how the diagnosis of mental disorder may affect the diagnosed subject’s self-concept by supplying an account that emphasizes the influence of autobiographical and social narratives on self-understanding. It focuses primarily on the diagnoses made according to the criteria provided by the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), and suggests that the DSM diagnosis may function as a source of narrative that affects the subject’s self-concept. Engaging in this analysis by appealing to autobiographies and memoirs written (...)
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  8. Conversation, Responsibility, and Autism Spectrum Disorder.Nathan Stout - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (7):1-14.
    In this paper, I present a challenge for Michael McKenna’s conversational theory of moral responsibility. On his view, to be a responsible agent is to be able to engage in a type of moral conversation. I argue that individuals with autism spectrum disorder present a considerable problem for the conversational theory because empirical evidence on the disorder seems to suggest that there are individuals in the world who meet all of the conditions for responsible agency that the theory (...)
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  9. Free Energy and Virtual Reality in Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience: A Complexity Theory of Dreaming and Mental Disorder.Jim Hopkins - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
    This paper compares the free energy neuroscience now advocated by Karl Friston and his colleagues with that hypothesised by Freud, arguing that Freud's notions of conflict and trauma can be understood in terms of computational complexity. It relates Hobson and Friston's work on dreaming and the reduction of complexity to contemporary accounts of dreaming and the consolidation of memory, and advances the hypothesis that mental disorder can be understood in terms of computational complexity and the mechanisms, including synaptic pruning, (...)
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  10. Too Fast or Too Slow? Time and Neuronal Variability in Bipolar Disorder—A Combined Theoretical and Empirical Investigation.Timothy Lane & Georg Northoff - forthcoming - Schizophrenia Bulletin 43.
    Time is an essential feature in bipolar disorder (BP). Manic and depressed BP patients perceive the speed of time as either too fast or too slow. The present article combines theoretical and empirical approaches to integrate phenomenological, psychological, and neuroscientific accounts of abnormal time perception in BP. Phenomenology distinguishes between perception of inner time, ie, self-time, and outer time, ie, world-time, that desynchronize or dissociate from each other in BP: inner time speed is abnormally slow (as in depression) or (...)
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  11. Some Epistemological Concerns About Dissociative Identity Disorder and Diagnostic Practices in Psychology.Michael J. Shaffer & Jeffery Oakley - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):1-29.
    In this paper we argue that dissociative identity disorder (DID) is best interpreted as a causal model of a (possible) post-traumatic psychological process, as a mechanical model of an abnormal psychological condition. From this perspective we examine and criticize the evidential status of DID, and we demonstrate that there is really no good reason to believe that anyone has ever suffered from DID so understood. This is so because the proponents of DID violate basic methodological principles of good causal (...)
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  12. Self and Identity in Borderline Personality Disorder: Agency and Mental Time Travel.Natalie Gold & Michalis Kyratsous - 2017 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 23 (5):1020-1028.
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  13. From Affective Science to Psychiatric Disorder: Ontology as Semantic Bridge.Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen & Janna Hastings - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychiatry 9 (487):1-13.
    Advances in emotion and affective science have yet to translate routinely into psychiatric research and practice. This is unfortunate since emotion and affect are fundamental components of many psychiatric conditions. Rectifying this lack of interdisciplinary integration could thus be a potential avenue for improving psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. In this contribution, we propose and discuss an ontological framework for explicitly capturing the complex interrelations between affective entities and psychiatric disorders, in order to facilitate mapping and integration between affective science and (...)
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  14. Psychopathy, Adaptation, and Disorder.Daniel Brian Krupp, Lindsay A. Sewall, Martin L. Lalumière, Craig Sheriff & Grant T. Harris - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4:1-5.
    In a recent study, we found a negative association between psychopathy and violence against genetic relatives. We interpreted this result as a form of nepotism and argued that it failed to support the hypothesis that psychopathy is a mental disorder, suggesting instead that it supports the hypothesis that psychopathy is an evolved life history strategy. This interpretation and subsequent arguments have been challenged in a number of ways. Here, we identify several misunderstandings regarding the harmful dysfunction definition of mental (...)
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  15. Why the Mental Disorder Concept Matters.Dusan Kecmanovic - 2011 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 4 (1):1-9.
    The mental disorder concept has not been paid due attention to. The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to assess how much space has been given to the mental disorder concept in textbooks of psychiatry, and second, to show in how many domains both within and beyond psychiatry the mental disorder concept plays a key role. A number of textbooks written in English, German, French, Spanish, and Italian, selected as examples, have been scanned so as to (...)
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  16.  76
    From Being Unaccountable to Suffering From Severe Mental Disorder and (Possibly) Back Once Again to Being Unaccountable.Christer Svennerlind - 2015 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 8 (2):45-58.
    From 1965, the Swedish penal law does not require accountability as a condition for criminal responsibility. Instead, severely mentally disordered offenders are sentenced to forensic psychiatric care. The process that led to the present legislation had its origins in a critique of the concept of accountability that was first launched 50 years earlier by the founding father of Swedish forensic psychiatry, Olof Kinberg. The concept severe mental disorder is part of the Criminal Code as well as the Compulsory Mental (...)
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  17. Being Free by Losing Control: What Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Can Tell Us About Free Will.Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld & Damiaan Denys - forthcoming - In Walter Glannon (ed.), Free Will and the Brain: Neuroscientific, Philosophical, and Legal Perspectives on Free Will.
    According to the traditional Western concept of freedom, the ability to exercise free will depends on the availability of options and the possibility to consciously decide which one to choose. Since neuroscientific research increasingly shows the limits of what we in fact consciously control, it seems that our belief in free will and hence in personal autonomy is in trouble. -/- A closer look at the phenomenology of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) gives us reason to doubt the traditional concept of (...)
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  18. Epistemic Anxiety, Adaptive Cognition, and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.Juliette Vazard - 2018 - Discipline Filosofiche 2 (Philosophical Perspectives on Af):137-158.
    Emotions might contribute to our being rational cognitive agents. Anxiety – and more specifically epistemic anxiety – provides an especially interesting case study into the role of emotion for adaptive cognition. In this paper, I aim at clarifying the epistemic contribution of anxiety, and the role that ill-calibrated anxiety might play in maladaptive epistemic activities which can be observed in psychopathology. In particular, I argue that this emotion contributes to our ability to adapt our cognitive efforts to how we represent (...)
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  19. Review of the „Handbook of Antisocial personality disorder“. [REVIEW]Andrej Poleev - 2018 - Enzymes 16.
    The Antisocial personality disorder and several other psychiatric constructs are questioned and deconstructed in this review, that uses psychoanalytic approach to explain the nature of psychopathy and to give recommendations in this respect.
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  20. Belief, Quasi-Belief, and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.Robert Noggle - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):654-668.
    Obsessive-compulsive disorder poses a puzzle about beliefs: Those with OCD experience anxiety and motivation suggesting that they believe something, even though they may profess not to believe that very thing. OCD also poses a puzzle about free will, since persons with OCD often describe their behavior as compelled, though it is unclear how it is compelled. This paper argues that at least some cases of OCD are best described as being driven by “quasi-beliefs” which have some, but not all, (...)
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  21. Intrusive Uncertainty in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder.Tom Cochrane & Keeley Heaton - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (2):182-208.
    In this article we examine obsessive compulsive disorder. We examine and reject two existing models of this disorder: the Dysfunctional Belief Model and the Inference-Based Approach. Instead, we propose that the main distinctive characteristic of OCD is a hyperactive sub-personal signal of being in error, experienced by the individual as uncertainty about his or her intentional actions. This signalling interacts with the anxiety sensitivities of the individual to trigger conscious checking processes, including speculations about possible harms. We examine (...)
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  22.  36
    The Harm of Medical Disorder as Harm in the Damage Sense.David Limbaugh - 2019 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40 (1):1-19.
    Jerome Wakefield has argued that a disorder is a harmful dysfunction. This paper develops how Wakefield should construe harmful in his harmful dysfunction analysis. Recently, Neil Feit has argued that classic puzzles involved in analyzing harm render Wakefield’s HDA better off without harm as a necessary condition. Whether or not one conceives of harm as comparative or non-comparative, the concern is that the HDA forces people to classify as mere dysfunction what they know to be a disorder. For (...)
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  23. Social Construction, Biological Design, and Mental Disorder.Jerome C. Wakefield - 2014 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (4):349-355.
    Pierre-Henri Castel provides a short but richly argued precis of his recently published two-volume 1,000-page masterwork on the history of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Having not read the as-yet-untranslated books, I write this commentary from Plato’s cave, trying to infer the reality of Castel’s analysis from expository shadows. I am unlikely to be more successful than Plato’s poor troglodytes, so I apologize ahead of time for any misunderstandings. Moreover, I cannot assess Castel’s detailed evidential case for his substantive theses.1 I thus (...)
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  24. Multiple Personality Disorder: A Phenomenological/Postmodern Account.James R. Mensch - manuscript
    A striking feature of post-modernism is its distrust of the subject. If the modern period, beginning with Descartes, sought in the subject a source of certainty, an Archimedian point from which all else could be derived, post- modernism has taken the opposite tack. Rather than taking the self as a foundation, it has seen it as founded, as dependent on the accidents which situate consciousness in the world. The same holds for the unity of the subject. Modernity, in its search (...)
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  25.  64
    Intrinsic Brain Activity of Subcortical-Cortical Sensorimotor System and Psychomotor Alterations in Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder.Timothy Joseph Lane - 2020 - Schizophrenia Research 215.
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  26. Psychopathy and the DSM-IV Criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder.Robert Hare, S. D. Hart & T. J. Harpur - 1991 - Journal of Abnormal Psychology 100: 391–398.
    The Axis II Work Group of the Task Force on Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) has expressed concern that antisocial personality disorder (APD) criteria are too long and cumbersome and that they focus on antisocial behaviors rather than personality traits central to traditional conceptions of psychopathy and to international criteria. R. D. Hare et al describe an alternative to the approach taken in the DSM-III—Revised (DSM-III—R; American Psychiatric Association, 1987), namely, the revised Psychopathy Checklist. The authors (...)
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  27. Reason and Freedom: Margaret Cavendish on the Order and Disorder of Nature.Karen Detlefsen - 2007 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 89 (2):157-191.
    According to Margaret Cavendish the entire natural world is essentially rational such that everything thinks in some way or another. In this paper, I examine why Cavendish would believe that the natural world is ubiquitously rational, arguing against the usual account, which holds that she does so in order to account for the orderly production of very complex phenomena (e.g. living beings) given the limits of the mechanical philosophy. Rather, I argue, she attributes ubiquitous rationality to the natural world in (...)
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  28.  70
    A Climate of Disorder: What to Do About the Obstacles to Effective Climate Politics.Aaron Maltais - 2016 - In Clare Hayward & Dominic Roser (eds.), Climate Justice in a Non-Ideal World. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 43-63.
    The emphasis on general distributive principles in the climate justice literature has left significant gaps regarding the problem of weak climate governance. The main contribution of this chapter is to show how normative theory can contribute to addressing the apparent political incapacity to respond to the threat of climate disruption. The chapter argues that a set of six underlying obstacles to effective climate change politics can serve as a framework around which ‘non-ideal’ normative theorizing about climate politics can be organized. (...)
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  29. The Concept of Mental Disorder and the DSM-V.Massimiliano Aragona - 2009 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 2 (1):1-14.
    In view of the publication of the DSM-V researchers were asked to discuss the theoretical implications of the definition of mental disorders. The reasons for the use, in the DSM-III, of the term disorder instead of disease are considered. The analysis of these reasons clarifies the distinction between the general definition of disorder and its implicit, technical meaning which arises from concrete use in DSM disorders. The characteristics and limits of this technical meaning are discussed and contrasted to (...)
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  30.  40
    ANN for Diagnosing Autism Spectrum Disorder.Mohammad Nassar - 2020 - International Journal of Academic Information Systems Research (IJAISR) 3 (12):12-17.
    In this paper an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) model, was developed and tested for diagnosing Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). A dataset collected from ASD screening app was used in this paper, it contains ASD tests results based upon questions answers from users. Test data evaluation shows that the ANN model is able to correctly diagnose ASD with 100% accuracy.
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  31. Addiction as a Disorder of Self-Control.Edmund Henden - forthcoming - In Hanna Pickard & Serge Ahmed (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of Addiction. Routledge.
    Impairment of self-control is often said to be a defining feature of addiction. Yet many addicts display what appears to be a considerable amount of control over their drug-oriented actions. Not only are their actions clearly intentional and frequently carried out in a conscious and deliberate manner, there is evidence that many addicts are responsive to a wide range of ordinary incentives and counter-incentives. Moreover, addicts have a wide variety of reasons for using drugs, reasons which often seem to go (...)
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  32. Mind-Brain Dichotomy, Mental Disorder, and Theory of Mind.Wesley Buckwalter - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):511-526.
    The tendency to draw mind-brain dichotomies and evaluate mental disorders dualistically arises in both laypeople and mental health professionals, leads to biased judgments, and contributes to mental health stigmatization. This paper offers a theory identifying an underlying source of these evaluations in social practice. According to this theory, dualistic evaluations are rooted in two mechanisms by which we represent and evaluate the beliefs of others in folk psychology and theory of mind: the doxastic conception of mental disorders and doxastic voluntarism. (...)
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  33. Griffiths, M., Shonin, E., & Van Gordon, W. (2015). Mindfulness as a Treatment for Gambling Disorder. Journal of Gambling and Commercial Gaming Research, In Press.Mark Griffiths, Edo Shonin & William Van Gordon - 2015 - Journal of Gambling and Commercial Gaming Research 1:1-6.
    Mindfulness is a form of meditation that derives from Buddhist practice and is one of the fastest growing areas of psychological research. Studies investigating the role of mindfulness in the treatment of behavioural addictions have – to date – primarily focused on gambling disorder. Recent pilot studies and clinical case studies have demonstrated that weekly mindfulness therapy sessions can lead to clinically significant change among individuals with gambling problems. Although preliminary findings indicate that there are applications for mindfulness approaches (...)
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  34. Psychological Perspectives Of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.Mia Ryan - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Malaysia
    Part (a) -/- 'Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a form of anxiety where the person has thoughts, images or ideas which they find hard to ignore (obsessions). This can lead to them feeling that they have a need to perform certain things to feel better (compulsions). -/- Part (b) -/- For two of the perspectives named in Part a, one from either Psychodynamic or cognitive and the other from either Biological or behaviourism using a table like the one below evaluate (...)
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  35. Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Scientific Epistemology.Steven Thurber, William Sheehan & Richards J. Roberts - 2009 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 2 (2):33-39.
    Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) continues to be controversial with arguments for and against its veracity being waged by individuals representing a variety of disciplines from behavioral scientists to philosophers. Our perspective focuses on the epistemological underpinnings of what is now commonly known as ADHD. Its ignominious history and current disputes may stem from a "pessimistic" epistemology, meaning that truth is only the province of persons in authority and power. The authoritative organizations that govern the diagnostic labels and criteria (...)
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  36. In Quest of Specific Neurons of Mind and Mental Disorder.Jakob Korf - 2013 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 6 (1):34-38.
    The essay questions the role of neurons in the concept of mind. The mind is considered as an emerging but physical property of the brain: a mental brain configuration does exist. This configuration is relatively resistant to brain damage, coma, hypoxia and normal (electro)physiological brain states and is envisioned as a relatively stable (nearly anatomical) structure. Consistent with this idea is that, despite the lifetime turnover of their constituents (e.g. proteins and nucleotides) and morphological changes, brain neurons do not divide. (...)
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  37. Autonomy and Ulysses Arrangements.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2012 - In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press. pp. 252-280.
    In this chapter, I articulate the structure of a general concept of autonomy and then reply to possible objections with reference to Ulysses arrangements in psychiatry. The line of argument is as follows. Firstly, I examine three alternative conceptions of autonomy: value-neutral, value-laden, and relational. Secondly, I identify two paradigm cases of autonomy and offer a sketch of its concept as opposed to the closely related freedom of action and intentional agency. Finally, I explain away the autonomy paradox, to which (...)
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  38. Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science.Keith Stenning & Michiel van Lambalgen - 2008 - Boston, USA: MIT Press.
    In the late summer of 1998, the authors, a cognitive scientist and a logician, started talking about the relevance of modern mathematical logic to the study of human reasoning, and we have been talking ever since. This book is an interim report of that conversation. It argues that results such as those on the Wason selection task, purportedly showing the irrelevance of formal logic to actual human reasoning, have been widely misinterpreted, mainly because the picture of logic current in psychology (...)
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  39. Becoming More Oneself? Changes in Personality Following DBS Treatment for Psychiatric Disorders: Experiences of OCD Patients and General Considerations.Sanneke De Haan, Erik Rietveld, Martin Stokhof & Damiaan Denys - 2017 - PLoS ONE 12 (4):1-27.
    Does DBS change a patient’s personality? This is one of the central questions in the debate on the ethics of treatment with Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS). At the moment, however, this important debate is hampered by the fact that there is relatively little data available concerning what patients actually experience following DBS treatment. There are a few qualitative studies with patients with Parkinson’s disease and Primary Dystonia and some case reports, but there has been no qualitative study yet with patients (...)
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  40. Toward a Critical Theory of Harm: Ableism, Normativity, and Transability (BIID).Joel Michael Reynolds - 2016 - APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine 16 (1):37-45.
    Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) is a very rare condition describing those with an intense desire or need to move from a state of ability to relative impairment, typically through the amputation of one or more limbs. In this paper, I draw upon research in critical disability studies and philosophy of disability to critique arguments based upon the principle of nonmaleficence against such surgery. I demonstrate how the action-relative concept of harm in such arguments relies upon suspect notions of (...)
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  41. The Rubber Hand Illusion Reveals Proprioceptive and Sensorimotor Differences in Autism Spectrum Disorders.Bryan Paton, Jakob Hohwy & Peter Enticott - 2011 - Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders.
    Autism spectrum disorder is characterised by differences in unimodal and multimodal sensory and proprioceptive processing, with complex biases towards local over global processing. Many of these elements are implicated in versions of the rubber hand illusion, which were therefore studied in high-functioning individuals with ASD and a typically developing control group. Both groups experienced the illusion. A number of differences were found, related to proprioception and sensorimotor processes. The ASD group showed reduced sensitivity to visuotactile-proprioceptive discrepancy but more accurate (...)
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  42. Autism, Episodic Memory, and Moral Exemplars.Nathan Stout - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):858-870.
    This paper presents a challenge for exemplar theories of moral concepts. Some have proposed that we acquire moral concepts by way of exemplars of actions that are prohibited as well as of actions that are required, and we classify newly encountered actions based on their similarity to these exemplars. Judgments of permissibility then follow from these exemplar-based classifications. However, if this were true, then we would expect that individuals who lacked, or were deficient in, the capacity to form or access (...)
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  43. Reasons-Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility: The Case of Autism.Nathan Stout - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (4):401-418.
    In this paper, I consider a novel challenge to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s reasons-responsiveness theory of moral responsibility. According to their view, agents possess the control necessary for moral responsibility if their actions proceed from a mechanism that is moderately reasons-responsive. I argue that their account of moderate reasons-responsiveness fails to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for moral responsibility since it cannot give an adequate account of the responsibility of individuals with autism spectrum disorder. Empirical evidence suggests (...)
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  44. Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not Morally Responsible, Subject to Criminal Punishment And to Preventive Detention.Ken Levy - 2011 - San Diego Law Review 48:1299-1395.
    I argue for two propositions. First, contrary to the common wisdom, we may justly punish individuals who are not morally responsible for their crimes. Psychopaths – individuals who lack the capacity to feel sympathy – help to prove this point. Scholars are increasingly arguing that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their behavior because they suffer from a neurological disorder that makes it impossible for them to understand, and therefore be motivated by, moral reasons. These same scholars then infer (...)
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  45. 'He Only Comes Out When I Drink My Gin’: DID, Personal Identity, and Moral Responsibility.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2016 - In Rocco J. Gennaro & Casey Harison (eds.), The Who and Philosophy. Rowman & Littlefield: Lexington Press. pp. 121-134.
    This essay explores the topic of Dissociative Identity Disorder (formerly called “Multiple Personality Disorder”) with special attention to such Quadrophenia masterpieces as “Dr. Jimmy” and “The Real Me.” A number of major philosophical questions arise: Can two or more “persons” really inhabit the same body? How can we hold Dr. Jimmy morally responsible for the reprehensible actions of Mr. Jim? Wouldn’t it be wrong to do so if they are really different people? What is it to be the (...)
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  46. On the Nature of Obsessions and Compulsions.Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld & Damiaan Denys - 2013 - In David S. Baldwin & Brian E. Leonard (eds.), Modern trends in pharmacopsychiatry - Anxiety Disorders. Karger. pp. 1-15.
    In this chapter we give an overview of current and historical conceptions of the nature of obsessions and compulsions. We discuss some open questions pertaining to the primacy of the affective, volitional or affective nature of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Furthermore, we add some phenomenological suggestions of our own. In particular, we point to the patients’ need for absolute certainty and the lack of trust underlying this need. Building on insights from Wittgenstein, we argue that the kind of certainty the (...)
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  47. Has Autism Changed?Simon Cushing - 2018 - In Monika dos Santos & Jean-Francois Pelletier (eds.), The Social Constructions and Experiences of Madness. Leiden: Brill. pp. 75-94.
    The fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) was published in 2013 containing the following changes from the previous edition: gone are the subcategories ‘Autistic Disorder,’ ‘Asperger Syndrome’ and ‘PDD-NOS,’ replaced by the single diagnosis ‘Autism Spectrum Disorder,’ and there is a new category ‘Social Communication Disorder.’ In this paper I consider what kind of reasons would justify these changes if one were (a) a realist about autism, or (b) one were a (...)
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  48.  70
    Somatoparaphrenia, Anosognosia, and Higher-Order Thoughts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2015 - In Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 55-74.
    Somatoparaphrenia is a pathology of self characterized by the sense of alienaton from parts of one’s body. It is usually construed as a kind of delusional disorder caused by extensive right hemisphere lesions. Lesions in the temporoparietal junction are common in somatoparaphrenia but deep cortical regions (for example, the posterior insula) and subcortical regions (for example, the basal ganglia) are also sometimes implicated (Valler and Ronschi 2009). Patients are often described as feeling that a limb belongs to another person (...)
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  49. Nepotistic Patterns of Violent Psychopathy: Evidence for Adaptation?D. B. Krupp, L. A. Sewall, M. L. Lalumière, C. Sheriff & G. T. Harris - 2012 - Frontiers in Psychology 3:1-8.
    Psychopaths routinely disregard social norms by engaging in selfish, antisocial, often violent behavior. Commonly characterized as mentally disordered, recent evidence suggests that psychopaths are executing a well-functioning, if unscrupulous strategy that historically increased reproductive success at the expense of others. Natural selection ought to have favored strategies that spared close kin from harm, however, because actions affecting the fitness of genetic relatives contribute to an individual’s inclusive fitness. Conversely, there is evidence that mental disorders can disrupt psychological mechanisms designed to (...)
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  50. Autonomy, Value and the First Person.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2012 - In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press.
    This paper explores the claim that someone can reasonably consider themselves to be under a duty to respect the autonomy of a person who does not have the capacities normally associated with substantial self-governance.
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