Schroeder on the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem for Attitudes

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (3):1-8 (2013)
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Mark Schroeder has recently offered a solution to the problem of distinguishing between the so-called " right " and " wrong " kinds of reasons for attitudes like belief and admiration. Schroeder tries out two different strategies for making his solution work: the alethic strategy and the background-facts strategy. In this paper I argue that neither of Schroeder's two strategies will do the trick. We are still left with the problem of distinguishing the right from the wrong kinds of reasons

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Nathaniel Sharadin
University of Hong Kong


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