The Nought Belief Paradox

Nicholas Shackel

Erkenntnis 79 (3):523-529 (2014) Copy BIBT_EX

Abstract

A paradox is presented that the poses new problems for both the truth norm and the knowledge norm of belief.

Cite

Plain text

BibTeX

Formatted text

Reference Manager

RefWorks

Options

Mark as duplicate

Find it on Scholar

Request removal from index

Revision history

View on PhilPapers

Author's Profile

Nicholas Shackel

Cardiff University

Archival history

First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 4 (2016-01-21)
View all versions

Categories

Epistemic Normativity, Misc in Epistemology

Epistemic Norms in Epistemology

Ethics of Belief in Epistemology

Knowledge, Miscellaneous in Epistemology

Norms of Assertion in Philosophy of Language

The Nature of Belief in Philosophy of Mind

Keywords

norm belief knowledge paradox nought truth assertion

Reprint years

DOI

10.1007/s10670-013-9521-9

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-08-13

Downloads
658 (#22,351)

6 months
64 (#62,672)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload

This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.

How can I increase my downloads?