Doxastic Wronging, Disrespectful Belief, & The Moral Over-Demandingness Objection

Journal of Value Inquiry:1-11 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Some scholars working on the ethics of belief argue that we can wrong each other in virtue of what we believe. This thesis is known as doxastic wronging. Proponents of doxastic wronging have different views about when our beliefs wrong. A prominent view is that our beliefs wrong when they falsely diminish. I call this the false diminishment account of doxastic wronging. In this paper, I argue against this account on the grounds that it is morally overdemanding. Nevertheless, I agree with proponents that our beliefs are sometimes morally objectionable. I offer an account of disrespectful belief which holds that our beliefs are disrespectful when they falsely deflate, i.e., incorrectly underestimate, and thereby lead us to undervalue morally significant features of each other’s personhood. My view implies that we can form disrespectful beliefs about each other even if we do not wrong each other by forming them.

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Stephanie Sheintul
University of Adelaide

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