Personal Identity

In Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford: (forthcoming)
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Our aim in this entry is to articulate the state of the art in the moral psychology of personal identity. We begin by discussing the major philosophical theories of personal identity, including their shortcomings. We then turn to recent psychological work on personal identity and the self, investigations that often illuminate our person-related normative concerns. We conclude by discussing the implications of this psychological work for some contemporary philosophical theories and suggesting fruitful areas for future work on personal identity.
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Folk Mereology is Teleological.Rose, David & Schaffer, Jonathan
The Essential Moral Self.Strohminger, Nina & Nichols, Shaun
.Swinburne, R. G.

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